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lFAREWELL TO AN IDEA? IDEOLOGY IN
LEGAL THEORY
David Chamy*
CuLTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY. By J.M. Balkin.
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp. xii, 335. $35.

In 1956, Morocco inaugurated a constitutional democratic polity
on the Western model. Elections were to be held, and political par
ties formed, with voters to be registered by party. The Berbers,
however, did not join the parties as individual voters. Each Berber
clan joined their chosen party as a unit. To consecrate (or, perhaps,
to accomplish) the clan's choice, a bullock was sacrificed.1
These sacrificial rites offer a useful parable about the relation
ship between law and culture. The social order imposed by law de
pends crucially on the "culture" of the participants in the system their habits, dispositions, views of the world and of themselves. A
legal regime - for elections, say - will call forth very different
modes of conduct in different cultures: here, the tribal and religious
culture of Morocco contrasts to the more individualist and secular
culture of Great Britain or the United States.
It is evident, then, that we need an understanding of the rela
tionships between culture and the legal order. The formal stipula
tions of law have effects that are mediated through the cultural
understandings in which they are embedded; indeed, even a basic
understanding of those stipulations requires participants in the soci
-ety to share a fundamental legal culture. Thus J.M. Balkin,2 em
barking on the task of constructing a theory of culture, enlists
himself in a company that includes such venerable jurists and legal
scholars as Vico, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Weber, Gramsci, and
Luhmann.
Yet this roster is also sufficient to remind us that the "theory" of
culture preeminently reflects the culture - and particularly, the
political concerns - of its time. Vico, for example, sought to vindi
cate the authority of the received Roman law - against the revolu
tionary claims of social contract theorists - by constructing a
"rational civil theology of divine providence" through a theoretical
*
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account of linked cultural and legal transformations.3 Although el
ements of his thought exerted a powerful influence among romantic
and modernist theorists, the project itself - a brilliant, albeit
largely ignored intervention into the debates of the day - is one
that modem readers are unlikely to find seductive, or even compre
hensible. Similarly, Montesquieu's meditations on the links be
tween law and culture appear driven, in part, by his sympathy for a
cautiously meliorist approach to the difficulties of the legal regime
of the French monarchy4 - the approach that lost out to the more
radical impulses embodied in the Jacobin revolutionary party. Of
course, one could tell the same story about more contemporary
figures; Weber's political polemics count among his most powerful
writing,5 and are indispensable to the interpretation of his more
theoretical work.
The political impetus to Balkin's argument is evident. The aim
is to reconstruct a conception of ideology as the basis for a critique
of social, particularly legal, arrangements and conceptions. The
fundamental notion is one of culture with the idea of cognitive tools
- "software" - that individuals use to make sense of the world
and of themselves. Software spreads from one individual to an
other: particularly, the units are of transmission "memes" - the
"smallest units of cultural skills or information 'that can replicate
themselves with reliability and fecundity."'6 "Ideology" is a partic
ular type of memetic structure - one that helps to sustain unjust
social arrangements. Having developed this general conception,
the book analyzes a series of structures by which persons organize
information into coherent but potentially ideological systems of
thought- narrative analogy, nested opposition, and the privileging
of selected attributes.
Balkin's book is a path-breaking effort to rethink legal critique
using these biological and cybernetic models; the scope of its ambi
tion and the subtlety of its execution are likely to make it a defini
tive work. For that reason, the book provides an important
opportunity to assess the usefulness of these models for thinking
about the law, and, indeed, about culture generally. My main tasks
here are to situate Balkin's argument in modem legal thought, to
display the structure of the argument, and to interpret its implica3. See MARK LILLA, G.B. V1co: THE MAKING OF AN ANTI-MODERN 108-25 (1993).
4. Cf., MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF nm LAWS, Books XI, XIX. Aspects of Montes
quieu as a critic of absolutism are discussed by Judith Shklar, Montesquieu and the New
Republicanism, in PoLmCAL THOUGHT AND PoLmcAL THINKERS 244 (Stanley Hoffman
ed., 1998).
5. As collected, for example, in MAX WEBER, PoLmCAL WRITINGS (Peter Lassman &
Ronald Speirs eds., 1994).
6. P. 47. The definition comes from DANIEL c. DENNE.Tr, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED
201 (1991).
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tions for current debates in legal theory and jurisprudence. Part I
of this review locates Balkin's notion of "ideology" in the debates
surrounding the term in legal sociology. Parts II and III take up the
two notions central to Balkin's reconstruction of the concept of ide
ology: the memetic structure of culture and the transcendental
foundations of the conception of justice. On the basis of this analy
sis, Part IV argues that Balkin's revisionary conception of ideology
provides the groundwork for an understanding of the rhetorical
structure of legal discourse.
I.

IDEOLOGIES

Balkin's use of the term "ideology" injects the work into a set of
long-standing debates. In the development of ideas about culture,
theories of ideology have served at least three purposes. The con
cept of "ideology" was first used in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries to describe the ideas - most specifically the
normative judgments - that supported a distinctive political pro
gram. The emphasis was on the partiality and schematic nature of
the ideas; pejoratively, the label "ideology" suggested that political
ideas were biased, rested on false factual claims or incoherent theo
ries, or were distorted by their purveyors in order to further a polit
ical agenda. More extensively, "ideology" came to refer not only to
consciously constructed or adopted programmatic notions, but also
to systems of thought, judgment, or inclination - "world views" that tended to support a particular social order. Definitive for this
usage was The German Ideology.7 The brilliance and polemical
force of its argument came in the merger of the narrow, political,
pejorative notion of "ideology" with the more extensive culturalist
understanding of the term. All aspects of culture could be "ideo
logical," with the connotation of partiality, bias, and distortion in
the service of political ends. The Marxist usage maintained the po
lemic, accusatory thrust of the label "ideology," while developing a
richer understanding of the ways in which ideas could have unde
tected social causes or unintended social effects. Ideas could evade
the conscious, reflective self-understandings of their putative cre
ators or advocates.
In the end, however, the specific polemic force of the concep
tion of "ideology" would dissipate precisely because of the range
and ambition of the underlying Marxist theory. The theory soon
lost itself in endless debates over the various relationships between
the "base" (physical and economic forces) and the "superstructure"
(ideas, or more generally, culture). In this guise, the notion of ide
ology - or "false consciousness" - played a particular role, not so
7.

KARL MARx & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (C.J. Arthur ed.,
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much in Marxist polemics, but in the theory of history and conse
quent understanding of political action. The predominance of "ide
ology" would explain such puzzles as why the unregenerate
working classes of the prosperous western democracies continued
to support the bourgeois status quo, rather than rising up to move
history onto its next, socialist stage: ideology had occluded the
proper "class consciousness," which would have permitted the
working classes to play their historically assigned role.8
These arcane and intricate debates lose their meanings when the
Marxist theory of historical progression is discarded. "Ideology"
then comes simply to refer to a worldview, without any implicit
claim about that view's wrongful partiality toward particular social
arrangements, or about its role in distorting the progress of history
and perverting the relations among the classes. Ultimately, the
term ''ideology" simply functions to emphasize the distinctive unity
of such coherent, practice-supporting systems of ideas, valuations,
and assumptions, but ceases to carry any significant critical implica
tions.9 The theory of "ideology" collapses into the general theory
of ideas or cultural constructions. This emptying-out of the specific
materialist and political content of the notion of ideology finds its
counterpart in the movement of ideas among analysts who contin
ued to work with a notion closer to the classical Marxist one. These
theorists announced the "end of ideology" in a distinctively political
sense. In the contemporary American polity, the theorists ob
served, the conditions for ideological conflict did not obtain; sharp
class division, with a distinct working-class consciousness, had dis
appeared or had never arisen. A pluralist political regime managed
to achieve rough accommodation among conflicting social
interests.10
Thus, one could choose between the demise of "ideology" in a
conceptual and in a practical sense. On the one hand, the predomi
nant modes of post-Realist legal scholarship pursued the practical
project of constructing a constitutional and legal order that corre
sponded to, and as necessary supported, the pluralist, "post..:ideo
logical" political vision.11 Of course, this accommodationist vision
8. Exemplary works on this tradition of thought include ERIK OLIN Wrumrr, CLAss, Cru
AND THE STATE (1978), and G.A. CoHEN, KARL MARx's THEORY OF HISTORY (1978).
9. See, e.g., Lours DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MAroc: THE GENESIS AND TRIUMPH
OF ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY (1977); Lours DUMONT, GERMAN IDEOLOGY: FROM FRANCE TO
GERMANY AND BACK (1994); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CuLTURES
(1973). Crucial figures in the transition are Mannheim and Weber.
10. The seminal text is DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY (1960), ironically pub
lished just at the dawn of one of the most intensely ideological periods in American political
history.
11. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
s1s
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was perfectly capable of rationalizing sweeping gestures in the
grand manner: "representation-reinforcing" judicial review might
seek to topple educational apartheid, redesign state legislatures, or
submit law enforcement to drastic new disciplines.21 But these radi
cal interventions were to be understood in a pluralist and inclusive
spirit.
On the other hand, the advocates of a critical or Marxisant vari
ety of contemporary legal thought, which arose in explicit revolt
against the "end-of-ideology" pluralism, found themselves wrestling
with the conceptual quandaries that had bafflea their forbearers.
Legal analysis replicated the familiar difficulties about the relations
between base and superstructure: how, consistently with an anti
idealist conception of social causation, could mere ideas play a role
in the determination of actual social - here, legal - relations?
Conversely, by what mechanisms did social relations determine the
content of the superstructural ideas in law, as Marxist "material
ism" seemed to require? These questions pose particular problems
for legal theorists because of the difficulty of locating law in the
classical base-superstructure dichotomy. On the one hand, the legal
system determines the rights and duties that are foundational for
bourgeois economic relations - particularly, by defining what it
means to be an owner of property (or, more generally, a bearer of
rights), the constitutive legal status for the bourgeois. On the other
hand, law would appear to be preeminently a system of ideas, ap
propriately analyzed as part of the "superstructure" rather than the
economic base. At the level of causation, the question was whether
the law's content could be understood as immediately determined
by economic forces; or whether law enjoyed a degree of "relative
autonomy" in the development of its fundamental conceptions. In
the latter case, the analyst's task in turn would be to display the
structure of the "bourgeois legal consciousness," while relating this
structure, ultimately, back to economic forces. One could then
speak of these independent ideas as forming a legal "ideology," not
only in the sense of a coherent cultural or intellectual system, but
also of a system that served to support a particular (here, bour
geois) social order.31
This complicated intellectual stalemate provides the setting for
Balkin's rethinking of the conception of ideology. Balkin remains
interested in the problems that generated previous theories of ide
ology - the possible unity of our systems of ideas or cultural con12. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1980.).

13. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stmcture of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv.
205 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 3 (1980).
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ceptions, their roots in social and economic contexts, and their
susceptibility to systematic critique. The book jettisons much of the
Marxist historical apparatus for a new theory that seems recon
structed by a type of pragmatic reduction. Yet, once the Marxist
historical theory is discarded, ideology is, as we have seen, a seem
ingly superfluous concept - it refers simply to any general unified
or coherent system of culture. Within our understanding of cultural
constructions, it can only play a distinctive critical role if it main
tains some normative or evaluative content. Balkin's acceptance of
this intellectual situation defines the double focus of the book. A
distinctive conception of ideology must rest on a normative theory;
which Balkin finds, not in a particularly Marxist notion of justice in
class relations, but in a more general conception of the inherent
claims about truth or justice fundamental to any coherent concep
tion of social order (ch.7). If a distinctive swath of a society's cul
ture is to be analyzed as "ideological," it is in the sense that this
swath has unjust effects - perpetuates unjust social relations. On
the other hand, this swath of culture will operate by the same cogni
tive logic as any other part of the culture: its normative valence
does not affect the mechanisms of its operations. These operations
are to be analyzed through a general model that would apply to all
cultural formations.
IL

CooNITIVE TooLSIMEMEs

The model's core notion is the "tool" of understanding broadly defined to include all of the knowledge, understanding,
skills, and cognitive faculties that allow us to negotiate our way
through the world and understand our place in it. Particularly, lan
guage is the "quintessential cultural tool" (p.24). Crucially, "tools"
- despite the common connotation of the term - need be neither
instrumental nor technical; they can serve expressive and social
functions. Most fundamentally, they enable us to understand our
selves and to develop and articulate our ends. In a deep sense, they
are constitutive of the self.
Tools are elements of our cultural software. Structurally, cul
tural software consists of "memes" - the basic "unit[ ] of cultural
transmission" (p. 43). Memes "encompass all forms of cultural
know-how that can be passed to others through . ..imitation and
communication" (p. 43). These patterns of transmission are best
understood by analogy to processes of ecology and evolutionary bi
ology, particularly to the propagation of viruses. Memes "survive"
if they are embedded in and used by individuals; they disappear or
become extinct when people have stopped using them. Memes
obey the laws of biological populations: they propagate themselves
by occupying persons' brains, and then guiding persons' activities,
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in a way that induces persons to preserve them and transmit them
for others.
The basic idea, then, is to treat ideas, information, skill, and
practices as the units of replication. "Culture" is simply the out
come of these interactions. Once one identifies the meme as the
unit of analysis for culture and defines it as (or analogizes it to) a
biological entity, a wealth of biological conceptions comes into play.
A meme may be parasitic on its host (the person), forcing the host
to spread the meme even while the meme harms the host itself; thus
maladaptive ideas may gain wide currency. Large cultural con
structs, like religious faiths, can be understood simply as a congeries
of mutually supportive memes. Memes can compete for particular
ecological "niches"; as a consequence of such competition, a thriv
ing meme may cause the extinction of its rivals.
The book's account offers a useful synthesis of the large litera
ture on ''memes," and it enriches that literature with a wealth of
specifically legal examples. But it remains unclear whether the
"meme" or "software" provides a cogent basis for a theory of cul
ture. As Balkin remarks in the Introduction, mechanistic and par
ticularly biological models are a persistent feature of Western
thinking about social conduct and social relationships: Descartes
seeks to understand persons as working like clocks; ancient and me
dieval thinkers thought of the polis in physiological terms, and,
later, in terms of a Newtonian machine. A striking feature of these
cognitive metaphors is their built-in obsolescence. They are, of
course, very much keyed to the science or technology that provides
the requisite models; as the conceptions of science change, so the
models change as well. Clocks were very much the avant garde de
vice of the seventeenth century. They were wonders, objects for
collection by connoisseurs; clocks that displayed their inward mech
anisms were particularly fashionable. Now the idea that one could
gain much purchase on the problems we need to resolve about per
sons by comparing them to clocks would seem a little odd, to say
the least.
Nonetheless, such models are not mere ephemera. They have a
deep cognitive structure, serving at least two disparate but often
mutually supporting ends. The models may work by providing a
picture of how persons work in terms of animals or machines; mod
ern cognitive scientists may consider the mind to be a computa
tional machine. Alternatively, the models may seek to understand
some collective or aggregative social entity in organic terms. For
example, the image of the "body politic" must be understood in the
context of the teleological physics and biology that governed the
European account of bodies from classical antiquity (as well as the
content of the association with particular bodies - the body of the
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king as an archetype for sovereignty). In this context, the stipula
tion that the polis is a body imported a teleological understanding
of the proper unified functioning of the community, based on prin
ciples of mutual responsibility within a system of hierarchy and
taken as an instantiation of an ideal form. This is precisely what the
Aristotelian teleological biology provided. The "modem" move to
a mechanistic analogy would reflect the loss of faith in this
premodem image of social 9rder. In the Aristotelian body, expla
nation would proceed by the doctrine of tendency to conform to
rational purpose. In the Newtonian cosmos, the coordinative mech
anism was a notion of force; in talking about political struggles, we
still find it natural to speak of a "balance of forces," an essentially
Newtonian image.14
How does Balkin's fusion of computation� and biological anal
ogies work to explain cultural formations? The concept of the
meme emerged in attempts to address issues largely oblique from
those that animate Balkin's project. The meme was developed by
biologists, cognitive psychologists, and philosophers who sought to
describe the processes of thought with conceptions that were en
tirely physiological and material - or, at least, observable by the
procedures of empirical science - and so would not depend on
supposedly occult metaphysical conceptions such as an individual
"consciousness."15 More specifically, some theorists hoped that
memes would explain how thinking, like other biological processes,
could be interpreted in terms of the evolution of organisms.16 Ide
ally, in this view, one would dispense altogether with consciousness
as a causal conception. Just as genes determine the structure of the
organism, so memes would determine the structure of thought and
of cultural activity. Correspondingly, philosophers convinced of the
inevitable role of "consciousness" in our mental life would dismiss
this conception of memes out of hand.17
As far as one can tell, Balkin's conception of ideology does not
depend upon this reductive, mechanistic project of modern cogni
tive psychology: he explicitly leaves room for the operation of con
scious thought and judgment in the development of cultural forms.
Instead, the book uses the "meme" to set itself against notions of
"collective," rather than individual, "consciousness"; the project is
to use a memetic model of thinking to account for culture and ide14. A historical exploration of the epistemic properties of such metaphors can be found
in HANs BLUMENBERG, PARADIGMS FOR A METAPHOROLOGY chs. 2, 6 (1997).
15. Richard Dawkins coined the term. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 192
(1989).
16. E.g., DENNEIT, supra note 6; DANIEL C. DENNETI, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA:
EVOLUTION AND TIIE MEANINGS OF LIFE (1995); HENRY PLOTKIN, DARWIN MACHINES AND
TIIE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE (1994).
17. See, e.g., JoHN R. SEARLE, THE MYSTERY OF CoNscrousNESS 105 (1997).
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ology consistently with "methodological individualism." Previous
accounts of culture, it is contended, had postulated suprapersonal
metaphysical entities that have no determinate existence. In con
trast, the memetic account of culture can be entirely formulated in
terms of the characteristics of the individual person and his cogni
tive apparatus.
The notion that there is a covert metaphysics to the thought of
such resolutely antimetaphysical thinkers as Levi-Strauss, Foucault,
or Habermas will intrigue some readers; the tendency of the argu
ment seems to recall, for example, Derrida's celebrated "decon
struction" of Levi-Strauss.18 However, the project of the book is
not primarily exegetical, and the suggestion is left undeveloped. As
it stands, it seems a somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation particu
larly of the structuralist point of view: it both underestimates the
force of the structuralist position and creates curious tensions with
the latter part of the book, which largely relies on structuralist
methods.
Indeed, the memeticist inevitably falls back on a structuralist ac
count.19 The difficulty for the student of memes is to provide some
explanation of how they "mean" - or, to speak more naturalisti
cally and pragmatically, how they have cognitive effects. The con
nection to structuralist accounts of language is readily developed.
In these accounts, the capacity of an isolated sensory or behavioral
unit - a sound, image, or gesture - to denote depends on its posi
tion in the structure of a language, which is defined in terms of its
difference from other units. No unit denotes in isolation, and a non
sense syllable is meaningless precisely because it differs from any of
the signifying sensory units that make up the structure as a whole.
It is the structure as a whole that is the language. Now, of course,
this structure is not an occult metaphysical entity in the sense in
which Balkin objects to these; though its precise embodiment whether in the hard wiring of brains, in the network of social inter
actions, or elsewhere - is controversial. The point is that some
such structure is required to give the notion of "meme" itself any
content: How else determine whether something counts as a
"meme"? Inevitably, then, the account of how memes work largely
18. See JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences, in D1sseM1(1982).
19. It should be noted here that structuralist analysis potentially plays two distinct roles
in Balkin's construction. First, one might offer a structuralist account of what counts as a
"meme" - the unit of cultural transmission. This, as I understand it, is what Balkin would
wish to resist. Second, one might use structuralist conceptions to explain how individuals
process memes to form larger units of thought, such as legal argument. See infra Part IV. It
is not entirely clear, at least to me, why the first use of structuralism, but not the second, is to
be stigmatized as involving appeal to illicit transpersonal entities. In any case, it seems to me
that at both steps of the construction, structuralism is not only a permissible, but a necessary,
feature of "memetics" method.
NATION
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recaps structuralist and semiotic work: Levi-Strauss's oppositions;
the dichotomy of metaphor and metonymy; Duncan Kennedy's
nested oppositions. While the book's development seems to offer
up these structures as merely contingent psychological features of
how memes are integrated by human minds, it is hard to see how
the notion of meme could have any content at all outside of such a
structuralist account.
Not only does the· conception of ''meme1' fail to avoid the diffi
culties faced by structuralisms generally; it brings with it a set of
problems peculiar to its own strategy. The transfer of biological
theories to the "meme" is a little tricky, to say the least. For one
thing, the unit of survival is difficult to define in a way that rigor
ously corresponds to the biological categories, and even more so
because identifying a meme is a matter of cultural interpretation.
In biology, one can distinguish rigorously between the genotype the gene - and the phenotype - the realization of the genotype in
a particular individual organism. It is indeterminate, however,
whether to treat the meme as genotype, phenotype, or organism (a
collection of, and substrate for, phenotypes). Here, the biological
analogy breaks down. In addition, the biological "gene" is identifi
able physically by a standard set of biochemical methods, and
guides organic development (the "expression" of the gene) through
a set of biochemical sequences that are remarkably well under
stood. There is no such corresponding physical specification of the
meme. Rather, its identification depends on the very processes of
cultural interpretation for which it is offered as an account.
Consider, as a very simple example, a musical phrase discussed
in Daniel Dennett's work, and taken up by Balkin.20 The phrase
consisting of the descending notes F-sharp, E, and D, opines
Dennett, is not a meme because it does not elicit any sense of rec
ognition on the part of an auditor. But, Balkin retorts, that's the
opening of "Three Blind.Mice," not to mention the slow movement
of Tchaikovsky's Pathetique symphony. One might add that, to a
musician trained in the modem theory of atonal music, the notes
form the pitch-class set 3-6 (12), consisting (in retrograde order) of
the pitch-classes 0, 2, and 4.21 As this example suggests, it seems
doubtful that one gains much purchase on the structure of culture
by identifying a particular fragment as a "unit of cultural transmis
sion." The fragment itself is not what is transmitted. The merely
behavioral notion of transmittability is inadequate to the task be
cause it does not tell us how to decide what counts as proper trans
mission of a meme, as opposed to invention of a new one. Rather,
20. P. 47. The example is from DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA, supra note 16, at
344.
21. See ALLEN FoRTE, THE STRUCTURE OF ATONAL Musrc 179 (1973).
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what makes the fragment accessible cognitively is its embedding in
a larger structure of perception or analysis - the sort of structure
with which Gadamer, for example, was concerned in the theories of
"tradition" that Balkin wishes to reject.22
This problem of embeddedness appears as well when one ana
lyzes the "natural selection" of memes - their survival properties.
The famed "spandrels" provide a good example. Spandrels are the
supports for roofing found in Romanesque churches. As the
Gothic design of ribbings developed, spandrels became superfluous
from a strictly engineering point of view; the spandrels were pre
served in design for their decorative function. Observing the span
drels of San Marco in Venice, biologists Stephen Jay Gould and
Richard Lewontin were struck by the analogy between this archi
tectural survival and the survival in biological organisms of struc
tures that had ceased to serve any strictly functional purpose.
Gould and Lewontin dubbed these biological remnants "span
drels," in analogy, or perhaps even in homage, to the architectural
spandrel.23 In a final maneuver, analysts import the concept back
into the realm of culture, observing that spandrel-like features features that have survived despite their loss of function - are
commonplace in cultural objects.
This intellectual fable itself suggests some cautions about evolu
tionary models of culture. Most apparently, the notion of "func
tion" in the cultural realm has none of the clarity of definition that
it has in evolutionary biology. As the goal of evolutionary biology
is to explain the selective survival of organisms, the notion of func
tion has a simple pragmatic definition: a feature of an organism is
functional if it aids survival. What might count as function, how
ever, is precisely what is in contention in the analysis of culture.
The notion that the merely decorative elements of a building serve
no function seems a curious regression to the banishment of orna
ment in the now lamented International Style of the postwar years.
Indeed, one is tempted to dismiss it as a spandrel itself - a belated
outbreak of a modernist delusion.
At stake here is not merely a particular question of aesthetic
taste, but the conceptual question - fundamental for biological
models of culture - of how "function" or "survival" are to be de
fined in the cultural realm. No one who has stood with the pre
scribed attitude of reverential awe at the cathedral of San Marco
would dismiss the spandrels as mere excrescences. Nor could one
say properly that the cathedral-type of which San Marco is an ex-

22.

HANs-GEoRG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD pt. I ch. 1, pt. II ch. 2 {1975).
23. See Stephen Jay Gould & Richard C. Lewontin, The Spandrels ofSan Marco and the
Panglossian Paradigm, in CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY {Elliott Sober
ed., 1984).
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emplar had "survived" if it had been stripped of what seems to
count from an engineering point of view as its functionless ele
ments. Clearly, the spandrels - or, more accurately, the design
sensibility that would introduce them - form part of the complex
of religious and aesthetic judgments that enable one to build, or
participate in, San Marco.24 In short, the biologism of the "meme"
suffers a severe limitation: what counts as a "meme" is itself a
question of cultural interpretation. In sum, to decide what counts
as a unit of cultural transmission (a "meme"), we need a prior ac
count of the process of cultural transmission; but once we have such
an account - say, a theory of the aesthetic coherence of architec
tural ornament, in the case of the spandrel - of what use is the
notion of a "meme"?
The "memetic" conception of culture is a curious echo of the
modernist aesthetic of the fragmentary, which finds its most promi
nent exemplars in works such as Eliot's "Waste Land," Pound's
Cantos, Stein's prose poems, or Joyce's Finnegan's Wake. In these
works, quotations ripped from context and set down with an ap
pearance of arbitrariness or discontinuity provide the basic material
for new works of art. This method contrasts sharply with more
traditional methods of allusion or incorporation in which the poet
rings his own subtle changes on a familiar image or trope: say, the
weary ploughman returning home from a hard day in the fields.
Rather, in the literature of the fragment, the form of detachment or
discontinuity underscores the sense of a radical break from the past
meanings - an inevitable loss of sense or aura. "These fragments I
have shored against my ruin"25 - the pathos here is that the grasp
ing of the fragment is really an emblem or symptom of the impend
ing cultural disintegration. Memetic analysis seems to look at this
fragmentariness in an up-to-date, techno-optimistic, celebratory
light. The change of mood may be refreshing, but the intellectual
maneuver begs a key methodological question: are these fragments
memes that have been successfully transmitted? Or does their con
text make them new memes that look like old ones but as such are
mere impostors or replicants? One can tell only by an act of inter
pretation which treats the work as a whole, in light of stipulative
canons of interpretation or aesthetic judgment.
The same problems appear as we turn to legal culture where,
indeed, mechanistic tendencies have a powerful claim even aside
from the meme. The meme of "equal protection" familiarly, drasti
cally changes its meaning as the accepted grounds for legitimate dif
ferentiation among citizens changes over time. So what is the status
24. Of course, this is the point of Ruskin's massive polemic on Venetian architecture. See
JOHN RUSKIN, THE STONES OF VENICE (1851-53).
25. T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in THE WASTE LAND, AND OTHER PoEMS 1. 431 (1962).
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of the meme? One soon finds oneself engaged in the parsing of an
elaborate, albeit familiar, set of legal distinctions - an intellectual
process in which the notion of "meme" makes no parsimonious ap
pearance. Familiarly, one may distinguish between the concept of
equality and the various conceptions of equality (which is the
meme?) and find that conceptions change, say, with changing social
consensus on certain questions of the scope of public morality.
Again, the conceptual apparatus can be labeled memetic, if one
wills; but the label has ceased to provide any guidance about how it
works. We are back to evocations of "political and social context"
(p. 88). The puzzle of how this interaction works - which bedev
iled, as we have seen, generations of ideology theorists - remains
unsolved.
III.

JUSTICE

Cultural Software's conception of ideology requires, as we have
noted, a theory of justice. Ideological thinking is no different in
cognitive structure from any other type of thinking; what makes it
distinctive is its effect - to cause or give support to unjust social
arrangements. This seems to place the memeticist in an exceedingly
awkward position: do not claims about justice rest upon transcen
dental foundations that any social constructionism - memetic or
otherwise - would have to reject?
Here Balkin deploys a variant of an argument that has been de
veloped by contemporary philosophical moral "realists."26 The ba
sic point is that anyone who holds convictions about justice must
claim that these convictions are valid for others, not simply for
himself.

[W] hen our actions affect other people and come into conflict with
other people's values and goals [, t] hen we have to defend what we are
doing....At that point .... [w] e must regard truth and j ustice as
something [sic] that has claims on others besides ourselves. We must
abandon the convenient dodge that what we believe is true and right
is true only for us and right only for us and for no one else. [pp.14546]
Unlike the philosophical realist, however, Balkin faces the difficulty
of integrating this strategy of argument into a system that leaves
room for a view of "ideology." Balkin apparently appreciates that
the argument from performative self-contradiction does not en
tirely support the analytic structure that he wishes to develop: after
all, within the perspective of Balkin's pragmatist social construc
tionism, it seems to remain open to the reader to deny the validity
of any standard of "justice," either for herself or for anyone else.
26. For a beautiful rendition of this point of view, see THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WoRD
(1997).
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So Balkin goes further to offer an affirmative account of
"[t]ranscendent[al] ideals of truth and justice" (p. 146). These ide
als are "presupposed in our understanding of encounters between
people as encounters between subjects of justice - that is, as the
sort of entities that can be treated justly or unjustly. Questions
about what is true and what is just necessarily arise whenever peo
ple affect each other's lives" (p. 146; emphasis added). Balkin de
velops the point with the example of a massacre:
We cannot understand the meaning of this massacre as a human ac
tion except by reference to an ideal of justice that applies to both the
victors and the vanquished. . .. [W]e cannot understand what their
murderers did - as the brutal actions of responsible individuals
rather than as the random or determined actions of objects - without
reference to a common and transcendent ideal of justice ....What
distinguishes [human] action is precisely the fact that it can be just and
unjust, and furthermore, that its meaning cannot be adequately un
derstood except against this fact. [p.147]

The argument here seems to make several different, although
closely related, claims about justice. One suggestion seems to be
that a conception of justice is essential for understanding human
action. The passage just quoted may remind some readers of Leo
Strauss's attack on the notion of a value-free social science: we can
not understand some human actions without characterizing them,
say, as "cruel," an essentially evaluative conception.27 The general
point is compelling, and definitive as a critique of a certain kind of
purportedly value-neutral social theory. It is quite a leap, however,
to start from the requirement of value judgment to understand
human action, and to end up with the particular type of value judg
ment needed for ideological critique as Balkin imagines it. After
all, one may readily deny that the notion of "justice" really allows
one to understand the massacre; it may occlude understanding. We
may wish to understand massacres, rather, in terms of an innate
drive toward death,28 or an imperative to compete for limited re
sources,29 or a racialist claim of the superiority of certain human
types.30 Each of these modes of understanding may invoke evalua
tive conceptions, but none requires any particular notion of what
social arrangements might count as unjust. It may be, rather, that
the only "valid claim" to be made about justice is, say, the
Thrasymachean one - that claims of justice are really just claims
about power, or, in contemporary parlance, "victor's history." This,
27. See LEo STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 52 (1953).
28. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO (James Strachey trans., W.W. Norton
& Co. 1952) (1913).
29. See, e.g., MARsHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE EcoNOMICS (5th ed. 1981).
30. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 158-266 (1951)
(describing ideological bases for twentieth century genocide).
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of course, is a sort of claim about of justice, but it is not one that can
ground Balkin's conception of ideology, which needs the ability of
the ideological analyst to test assertions against a more specific
standard. Indeed, one common conception of ideological analysis is
that it should aim to show that claims about justice or other suppos
edly transcendental values are really claims of the powerful,
designed to protect their interests or justify their depredations.
This particular form of ideological unmasking does not require any
affirmative conception of justice at all; it may simply embrace a
form of nihilism, which sees the unmasking of justice-claims as a
weapon in a struggle for power, and one which justifies itself in
terms of the benefits it wins for its own group.
Alternatively, Balkin's argument sometimes seems to rest its
conception of transcendental justice on an idea of mutuality. Once
one has entered into a discussion of questions of justice, one must
insist on a criterion of justice to which the interlocutor would also
agree, on "common values of truth and justice that we [all] are
somehow obligated to recognize" (p. 148). Transcendental concepts
must be postulated "whenever there is a clash or encounter be
tween the positive norms of different cultures, different groups, or
different persons . ... [O]ur encounter with an Other causes the
transcendent norm magically to spring to life" (p. 150). This simply
moves too quickly; it ignores the possibility that one can simply
"agree to disagree," as the expression goes, or even give up on the
project of mutual understanding altogether. Indeed, this is the es
sence of the modus vivendi - a normative order of a sort, but not
one that generates claims about justice that would support the prac
tice of ideological critique as Balkin conceives it. 13 Balkin's ac
count seems to conflate the notion that "one can make valid claims
about justice" with the more specific, but more controversial notion
that there are "common values of . . . justice that we are somehow
obligated to recognize" (p. 149).
Perhaps it is a sense of this weakness that forces the book's dis
cussion toward its third proposal about the sources of transcen
dence, that are now found, not in performative contradiction or in
the needs of social interpretation, but rather in conditions of mutual
intelligibility. Every culture, we are told - including, presumably,
the culture of nihilists - works with some "transcendent ideal of a
normative order" (p. 166).
[B]ecause all of our moral discourse presupposes the idea of subjects
and agents in a normative order, we can be intelligible to each other

31. Although Rawls of course does not pursue questions of ideology, his description of
the "modus vivendi" from which I have borrowed the term - identifies well this underly
ing amoral structure. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Cm. L.
RE.v. 765 (1997). Of course, Rawls objects to it but, unlike Balkin, does not claim that to
embrace it involves a performative contradiction.
-
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even if we do not always agree. Indeed, if we could not understand
the speech and actions of others as presupposing a normative order
with subjects and agents of some kind, it is likely that we would not
even understand them as being rational agents. [p.167]

The argument is apparently a rendition of Davidson's critique of
a certain notion of incommensurability or mutual incomprehensibil
ity.32 Davidson had shown that we could not without contradiction
speak of agents' working with a language or a conceptual scheme
that was radically incomprehensible to us. If we could not make
even the first step in interpreting a communication, it would be im
possible for us to say that we were dealing with a language or a
conceptual scheme at all. However, even allowing that the argu
ment can be extended to claims about normative schemes, the argu
ment still does not exclude, as Davidson's exposition makes clear,
the case of undecidability: indeterminacy about whether or not we
are in the presence of a rival, but uninterpretable, cognitive or nor
mative scheme. Is uninterpretability or mutual incomprehensibility
a sign that there is no coherent scheme at all, or simply a signal that
our own interpretive or communicative powers are failing?
Balkin evidently understands that there is a considerable ten
sion between these transcendental arguments and the positivist and,
apparently, social constructionist rhetoric of the work as a whole.
His final attempt at resolving this tension is a curious and revealing
conversation between the author and a hypothetical objecting prag
matist. Acknowledging that the notion of a "transcendent value" is
a mere Western construction, he proposes that the concept "is the
best way, given who we are and where we are now, to make sense
of these features of human existence - our experience of justice as
a[n] inexhaustible demand, and our sense of the inadequacy of all
attempts at capturing this value and making it determinate" (p.
168). Balkin explains:
Given who we are and where we have come from, the language of
transcendence is the best way to explain our ability to discuss ques
tions of truth and justice with other cultures and other persons. It is
the best way to understand the phenomenological demands of truth
and justice. It is the best way to describe the relation between human
values and the felt imperfections of this world. Moreover, transcen
dent concepts are implicated by many other beliefs about ourselves
and our world that we would find it hard to jettison. In other words,
the pragmatist argument for transcendent values is that one should
accept these concepts and this way of talking because they work. [pp.

168-69]
At the same time, "I argue that this way of talking is the most ade
quate way of describing the human predicament" (p. 169).
32. See DONALD DAVIDSON, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUIRIES INTO
AND INTERPRETATION 183·98 (1984).
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It is not clear, however, what it means for these concepts to
"work" ·or to be "adequate." For the critic of ideologies, it can
hardly be sufficient to say that they work because we like the out
come, or because we would find it arduous to get rid of them. Pre
sumably, the very point of ideological analysis is to question
conceptions that are built into our current modes of thought and
action. Alternatively, the claim that these conceptions are "ade
quate" in the scholastic sense
adequaetio verba ad rem
aban
dons pragmatism altogether. Nor can the point be that these
concepts are useful "for us." After all, we have just been informed
that the restriction "for us" involves a performative contradiction,
because, when others challenge our use of concepts, we will present
arguments that appeal to our interlocutors as well. In the end, the
"pragmatic" account of our sense of justice does more to create
doubt than to dispel it. Indeed, that may be one of its principal
virtues.
-

IV.

-

RHETORIC

In relation to previous work on ideology, Balkin's argument has
followed the strategy of strengthening one's position by tactical re
treat and a consolidation of force. The sweeping ambition to ex
plain the causes of ideas has been abandoned; with it the attempt to
construct a general theory of delusion. The result, as we have seen,
is an account of culture that is forceful on its own terms but that
operates at one level of removal from the cultural phenomena that
it purports to describe. Once one takes up the task of describing or
criticizing a particular cultural formation, the scaffolding of memes
and transcendental judgments falls away. What remains, however,
is a type of postmodern rhetoric: a system for understanding the
linguistic structures that persuade or generate conviction. This ap
proach to a rhetoric presents the book's most interesting features.
This structure of argument directly parallels Aristotle's rhetoric.
On one interpretation of the Aristotelian conception, rhetorical
processes are a crucial structural feature of the good life in the
polis, understood as the life of persons for whom living together in
a community is a defining feature of the self. Such persons will not
resolve the differences that naturally arise from the project of living
together simply through the exercise of pure reason or intellect.
That is the province of the philosopher alone, that is, of one who
has in a sense withdrawn from the community. For those in the
community, conduct on political matters is inevitably influenced by
passion and by the interests that arise from personal circumstance.
Rhetoric is the study of how to persuade persons so situated in the
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contexts of communal decision.33 Without processes properly un
derstood as rhetorical, the community could not collectively delib
erate - and so, could not be a community endowed with law and a
political order. As a subsidiary matter, rhetoric then includes an
understanding of how linguistic structures - particularly, the
tropes - can be deployed to guide inferences of persons in these
deliberative settings.
The core of the Aristotelian conception has continued to exert a
powerful seductive force, at least in the study of law. Legal thinkers
in their work constantly come up against the impetus to the rhetori
cal project - that the deliberative practice of the community inevi
tably differs from the procedures of philosophical reason (now to
be conceived as the modems understand it). Of course, this prem
ise is controversial. For economically oriented scholars, or for those
who see in our constitutional jurisprudence the latter-day embodi
ment of a Kantian dispensation, the work of the lawyer is simply
that of scientific or philosophical reasoning. For those unconvinced
by these projects, however, there remains the task of properly char
acterizing the distinctive modes of "reason" or deliberation that
characterize aspects of communal life, including the life of the law.
The Aristotelian model of rhetoric, however, is situated within
the more comprehensive Aristotelian view of persons: in the con
ception of the polis as a mode of living together; in the biological
psychology of the passions and of perception; and in the conception
of the distinctive place of the reason of the philosopher. The mod
em - or perhaps, more pertinently here, the "postmodern" rhetorician, by contrast, generally will adopt little of this apparatus.
He is left with the Aristotelian catalogue of tropes - some perva
sive, like metaphors, and others obscure and forgotten, like the ana
coluthon. At the limit, the tropes appear as entirely formal
linguistic structures that can be manipulated at will without refer
ence to the implicit anthropology by which the Aristotelian rhetoric
integrates them into a master social theory.
The modem rhetorician, then, faces two tasks of reconstruction:
he must lay the grounding for rhetoric in a conception of the person
and of communal life that fits modem understandings in a way that
the Aristotelian view (at least on most current readings) cannot;
and he must show how these account for the persuasive force of the
set of linguistic structures (the tropes) that constitute the rhetoric
itself. For exegesis, it is helpful to contrast Balkin's approach to
these problems with that of his more explicitly Aristotelian col33. On the connections between emotion and reason in the process of persuasion, see
Martha Craven Nussbaum, Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion, in EssAYS ON
AruSToTLE's RnETomc 303-13 {Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1996).
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league, Anthony Kronman, in The Lost Lawyer. 34 In terms of the
task of reconstruction that I have defined here, Kronman jettisons
the Aristotelian psychology for one founded in part on a Freudian
theory of drives and repression, in part on an existentialist depic
tion of the indeterminacy of the deep value choices. The specifi
cally Freudian notion of the integrity of the self - one in which the
self reflectively comes to terms with past losses and traumas commends a type of deliberation about the unity and coherence of
one's life. This type of deliberation then provides a model for the
corresponding deliberation among members of a community. The
intra- and interpersonal settings have in common the recuperation
of differences and losses that arise from the need to make choices
among irreconcilable competing goods.
Balkin's account of the "meme" provides the basis for a radi
cally different, and distinctively more agonistic, conception of the
self. The "memetic" and instrumentalized structure of the self sug
gests that the unity and coherence that Kronman postulates are elu
sive. Of course, one might posit a "master meme" that organized
all of the subordinate memes, extinguishing those that interfered
with some unified 'conception of the person. Balkin, however, con
spicuously omits this possibility; and the emphasis on the independ
ent action of memes as self-propagators seems to suggest that the
role of the self-censor in memetic adoption is never as forceful as
would be required to produce that coherence of the self which pro
vides, in Kronman's view, the telos of deliberation.
Correspondingly, then, Balkin's memetic view implies a more
chaotic, fragmentary, and conflictive account of the communal
processes that civic-republican Aristotelians perhaps too ideally de
scribe as "deliberative." In the world of social communication, de
liberation becomes a sort of war of all against all, a return to the
state of nature, except that the warriors are not so much individuals
as the memes that define individuals and that use them as vectors of
propagation. The public space is not a collection of rational selves,
but a swarm of viral particles of information. What rescues this
from utter bleakness is the (individually limited though collectively
determinative) power of each self to influence memetic propaga
tion, and the celebratory sense in which this diversity spawns ideals
and aspirations that might elude a more tightly controlled commu
nal discourse. This is a compelling and refreshingly subversive im
age of our communal space.
The second step in the rhetorical project (as I have tried to de
scribe it here) is the move from the reconstructed notion of deliber
ation - grounded in a "psychology" - to an understanding of the
34. ANrHoNY T. KRoNMAN, THE LoST LAWYER:
62-101 (1993).
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persuasive (socially causative) power of formal linguistic structures.
Here Balkin, influenced by various structuralist and poststructural
ist theorists, broadly adopts and recharacterizes the terms of the
Aristotelian tradition: distinguishing the synchronic from the
diachronic; organizing the synchronic around the fundamental
dichotomy between metaphor and metonomy; and analyzing the
diachronic through a theory of narrative. The difficulty which any
such rhetoric must face, however, is the seemingly formal character
of tropological analysis. Consider, to take one example, the meto
nymic analysis of our images of the "working mother" (pp. 255-58).
Balkin treats this as a case of metonymy as "prototype," in which
the housewife mother becomes the metonym, the linguistic and cog
nitive representative of our ideal of mothering generally. The "ide
ological effect" is to privilege a particular conception of the role of
the mother or, more generally, of the ways women should lead their
lives: "implicitly [to] demarcate normal, natural, and privileged as
sociations about mothers and fathers, nurturance and outside
work" (p. 257).

A problem here is that the formal identification of the tropolog
ical structure does not account for its persuasive force.35 Though
the rhetorical analysis here nicely explains how our notions of
"working mother" may reflect the workings of a metonymy, it does
not explain why we actually think of women through this particular
metonymy, rather than any other that one might construct. Why is
not the governing metonymy the notion of a "superwoman" who
does everything well, or the "public woman" who creates a distinc
tive role out of a position that comes to her in part through her
spousal relations? The determinacy of any particular ideological ef
fect seems to evade the formal results of a rhetorical analysis.
What the book avoids in its conception of ideology, then, is any
particular sense of material causation - a link between ideas and
economic or social situation, of the sort that gave earlier concep
tions of ideology their power. Ideas are neither symptoms of physi
cal trauma, nor covert expressions of class interest, nor distorted
expressions of biological drives, nor clever ruses of the brain to
achieve individual and species preservation. I suppose that each of
these might be formulated in terms of the memetic theory, and in
deed that Balkin would celebrate this openness to diverse social
phenomena - a form of methodological bricolage - as one of the
theory's most essential features. Yet, more appealing than this for35. This problem has been analyzed as the aporia between rhetoric as trope and rhetoric
as persuasion. See PAUL DE MAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING: FIGURAL LANGUAGE IN
RoussEAU, NIE1ZCHE, RILKE, AND PROUST 3-19, 103-31 (1982). Conversely, the persuasive
force always transcends the mere rhetorical form and seems to rest on something outside of it
(though, whenever that is identified, it turns out to be merely another formal rhetorical struc
ture - hence the notion of an "aporia" in rhetorical analysis generally).
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mal indeterminacy is the book's formulation of the senses in which
individual knowledge and self-understanding extend beyond the
bounds of entirely conscious reflection and choice. "Cultural
software dwells within us and is part of us . . . We become agents
and embodiments of history . . . cultural information . . . is made
part of our flesh" (p. 287). This "enfleshment is best symbolized by
the fingers of the jazz pianist":
These fingers possess a second nature. They know where to go. But
their responses are not foreordained. They are not automatic. The
fingers of the pianist respond to the moment, they improvise, they
create works of great beauty that never existed and never were
thought of before ... [pp.287-88]

This image of the self that creates prior to, or independently of,
conscious reflection, provides a powerful new basis for a pragmatic
conception of legal order.

